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Introduction
The idea of a European Public Prosecutor (hereinafter an EPP) is a conundrum. Whilst for
at least 15 years, experts tasked with the question of how to better protect the financial
interests of the EU have considered it a logical next step,1 others react to it as a rider of
the Apocalypse for European nation states. British citizens may famously ponder the
content of their unwritten Constitution but are equipped with the knowledge that it
features protection against joining the Euro and an EPP. 2 Perhaps only those unfa-
miliar with UK politics will express astonishment that a Constitution can leave human
rights seemingly less well protected than a means of payment and freedom from a judicial
office within a systemwe have entrustedwith amechanism to arrest and surrender citizens.
Many of those who live and work in the land which Montesqieu once heaped with praise
also share this astonishment and question this state of affairs which sees introducing a new
currency or a supra-national prosecutor beyond the reach of Parliamentary power, not,
however, the ability to provide for citizens to be detained for 90 days without charge. If the
United Kingdom Government must be viewed as expressing its scepticism in a radical
manner, it can nevertheless not be said to stand alone in some of its concerns. The question
of an EPP is divisive. The EU is soon set to discover just how strongly.
With the creation of a separate Directorate-General for Justice (splitting the former
DG Justice, Freedom, Security) on the 1st of July 2010,3 the post- Lisbon Treaty
Crime Law Soc Change (2013) 59:439–486
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1See the Corpus Juris study [28, 108] and the Green Book by the European Commission [8]. Reactions of
British press and Government are reported by Prof. John Spencer [29].
2Through the most likely insurmountable referendum requirement imposed by the European Union Act,
2011, c.11, s.6.
3See webpage http://ec.europa.eu/justice/mission/index_en.htm (last download 27.07.2012). Since September
2012 see also http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/index_en.htm (last download 21.10.2012).
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European Commission was structured to emphasise this area of work in a novel manner.
From the very beginning, the vigorous new Commissioner – Vice-President
Viviane Redding, set out an ambitious work-plan which foresees the tabling of
a proposal for a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (hereinafter EPPO) for
2013.4
Any proposal to create an EPPO will be viewed critically as a potential
encroachment upon the power of the sovereign EU member states to organise
and control the systems which administer criminal justice upon their territory —
a power usually held closely and dearly by the Parliaments of member states
themselves.5 This potentially revolutionary step forward comes at a time where such
developments will inevitably, and not entirely illegitimately, be eyed suspicious-
ly. The past years have seen the criminal justice related work of the EU
advance considerably with legislative initiatives for example to enhance the
rights of victims[1; p. 38, 43] and against phenomena such as organised crime and
terrorism [2–4]. In this way the EU has become established as an actor in the criminal
justice arena. The vast majority of member states argued only a few years ago that the
EU was in fact no more than their elected forum for multi-lateral action and that no
constitutional or broader governance consequences flowed from this.6 The cases of
Pupino,7 concerning the environmental directive8 and ship-source pollution9 demon-
strated this belief to have been false. Furthermore, the imbalance of actions taken –
which as agreed by the member states have almost purely favoured the punitive
efficiency of criminal justice systems – has been subject to considerable criticism.10
Nevertheless the Lisbon Treaty enhanced the EU’s potential as a criminal justice actor
also via article 86 TFEU providing a legal basis for an EPPO.
4 This constitutes an intent to use the newly provided legal basis for such an office to be found in the
European Treaties since the Treaty of Lisbon, article 86 TFEU. Like other criminal justice-related norms,
this regulation is an adoption straight from the failed Constitutional Treaty–see Herlin-Karnell, E. [30;p.1]
and van den Wyngaert, C.[31;p.204 et seq],. One can speculate how such a controversial legal norm could
survive a failure such as the Constitutional Treaty; optimists might suggest this as indicative of some notion
of agreement amongst even critical member states, that there might be good reasons for such an office–so
e.g. Zwiers, M. [32;p.6]; whilst cynics might reflect that those critics were distracted by even greater
controversies. The UK House of Lords for instance, recommended the abolition of this provision–see
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union [33;para. 93]. For one account of how it came to
be included in the draft Treaty see House of Lords Select Committee on European Scrutiny [34;paras.72–
82].
5 See Wade [35], Part III.I.C. For an analysis of sovereignty in this particular context see van den Wyngaert,
C. [31; p. 229 et seq.].
6 See e.g. the member states’ submissions to Commission of the European Communities v Council of the
European Union, case C-176/03, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 13 September 2005.
7 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino, C-105/03, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 16 June
2005.
8 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union, case C-176/03, Judgment
of the Court (Grand Chamber), 13 September 2005.
9 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union, case C-440/05, Judgment
of the Court (Grand Chamber), 28 June 2007.
10 Even by former Commission Vice-President Frattini, who expressed his concern that the EU had
developed an Area of Security although its mandate was to develop one of Freedom, Security and
Justice upon the occasion of a German Presidency conference on the failed Framework Decision of
Fundamental Rights in Criminal Proceedings, 20.02.2007, Berlin, see http://www.bmj.bund.de/enid/
68e692448b67b5925478ba1197305426,33d0e45f7472636964092d0933303334/Deutsche_EU-
Praesidentschaft_2__7/Verfahrensrechte_im_Strafverfahren_18q.html.
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Suggestions for a European public prosecutor
The driving force behind suggestions that an EPPO should be created is invariably the
efficient protection of the financial interests of the EC and now the EU. This proposal
can be seen as the logical conclusion of discussions which began with the famous
Greek Maize case.11 In this cornerstone judgement the European Court of Justice
ruled that the member states are under an obligation to protect the European Com-
munities’ interests by means equivalent to those which it protects its own respective
interests.12
In the area of financial interests the main problem may be regarded as fraud.13
Defrauding the public purse is an action all member states qualify as criminal within
their own system [5, 110; p.44 and 112; vor § 263 para. 51 et seq.]. The argument is
thus, quite naturally, that fraud against the European Communities/Union (i.e. the
European public purse), should in parallel be pursued as criminal. The member states’
have, however, consistently refused to endow the institutions and agencies of the EC/
EU with criminal justice powers. 14 Since 1999, the European Commission houses an
anti-fraud unit (OLAF), which has powers to conduct or perhaps more correctly to
initiate and co-ordinate administrative investigations.15 The EU remains entirely
dependent upon then finding a member state prosecution service willing and able
to take over responsibility for a case and bring it to court in order to secure criminal
convictions and punishment for such offences.16
OLAF have long maintained that national prosecution services often face enor-
mous challenges when called upon to prosecute offences against the financial inter-
ests of the EU [6;p.25]. Such cases are often complex and may require consideration
of acts committed or evidence found in one or more other member states. The
intricate financial regulations of the EU are also often new to prosecutors. Further-
more, national prosecution services may be so overloaded [7; p.5] in their daily
business that the will to take over or pursue the prosecution of crimes against another
“sovereign” involving the breach of complex “foreign” rules, may be lacking.
Calls for the establishment of an EPPO have been and are in essence the call for a
specialist service dedicated to ensuring such cases of complex and large-scale fraud,
etc. are brought to justice [8;p.12, 32, 37;p.13]. This restrictive remit is clearly
expressed in article 86 (1)TFEU which reads: “in order to combat crimes affecting
the financial interests of the Union, the Council, by means of regulations adopted in
accordance with a special legislative procedure, may establish a European Public
Prosecutor's Office from Eurojust” and further states: “The European Public Prose-
cutor's Office shall be responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to
judgment … the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, offences against the Union's
financial interests … It shall exercise the functions of prosecutor in the competent
courts of the Member States in relation to such offences” (article 86 (2) TFEU).
11 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965.
12 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965, paras. 23–25
13 For an explanation of possible modi see Spencer, J. [29;p.3 et seq.].
14 As for example in the competition law enforcement area.
15 Sometimes leaving them with very limited reach – see Vervaele, J. A.E. [36; p.180]. See also [104].
16 Report of the European Anti-Fraud Office [37; p.54]. A dependency also consciously retained for
Eurojust–See van den Wyngaert, C. [31;p.224 et seq. And 109].
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Given the controversy surrounding this potential office, perhaps surprisingly
article 86 (4), however also states: “the European Council may, at the same
time or subsequently, adopt a decision amending paragraph 1 in order to
extend the powers of the European Public Prosecutor's Office to include serious
crime having a cross-border dimension and amending accordingly paragraph 2
as regards the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, serious crimes affecting more
than one Member State. The European Council shall act unanimously after
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament and after consulting the
Commission” (for further analysis see [111 and 113]).
The Treaty of Lisbon has therefore also given birth to a provision which
incorporates a broader vision of what an EPPO might do. This perhaps reflects
the multi-faceted background of criminal justice work tackled previously within
the 3rd pillar of the EU [10;p.193, 11;p.449 et seq.]. It is furthermore in line with
other provisions of the TFEU which foresee EU criminal justice work more broad-
ly.17Article 86 (4) clearly views an EPPO as a potential figure in tackling offences
requiring trans-/supra-national co-operation. This EPPO would thus be a de-
scendant of the third pillar which the member states previously utilised to work
together in fighting certain crimes, viewed as threatening the Union as a whole,
deserving or indeed requiring common action [12–14]. The prime example of the
last decade is terrorism. Trafficking offences and currency counterfeiting provide
further examples of offences pursued through common action by all member states or
a number of Schengen18 or Eurozone member states respectively. Such activity is
reflective of the EU’s unique position as an instance of governance incorporating as it
does such developments as the border-check free Schengen area and the Euro.
The Commission is currently, however, exercising great caution to ensure
debate about an EPPO remains firmly related to the offences against the
financial interests of the Union.19 Any expanded discussion at this point would
likely heighten controversy and resistance to such an institution. It is interesting to
note the difference between the drafting of article 86 TFEU and the current proposal
preparation as tellingly symptomatic of EU workings. Depending upon the Zeitgeist,
institutional development is pushed by very different factors. At the moment Article
17 Article 83 (1) TFEU defines the areas of interest as those “of particularly serious crime with a cross-
border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat
them on a common basis” before defining these more closely as “terrorism, trafficking in human beings and
sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money launder-
ing, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime” but also adding
“On the basis of developments in crime, the Council may adopt a decision identifying other areas of crime
that meet the criteria specified in this paragraph. It shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the
European Parliament.”
18 The multi-lateral Schengen Agreement was signed by 25 EU member states, Iceland, Norway, Switzer-
land and Lichtenstein (though Great Britain, Denmark, and Ireland have opted out of certain categories of
co-operation). In 2003, it was integrated into the law or acquis of the European Union, and thus falls within
the ambit of the European Court of Justice. It is best known for abolishing internal border controls between
countries in Western Europe. For an introduction, see, e.g., House of Lords Select Committee [38]; See also
Wade [39].
19 Thus the clear mandate given, e.g. to the academic group developing model procedural rules–see http://
www.eppo-project.eu/index.php/Home. This work was presented at a recent conference: A Blueprint for
the European Public Prosecutor’s Office? EU model rules of criminal procedure in Luxembourg on the 13–
15th June 2012.
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86 is the tool of those seeking to protect a new and badly protected victim; the
EU, via criminal justice. Were circumstances similar to those when the Consti-
tutional Treaty was drafted (for that was the genesis of what is now article
8620), we would likely see a very different debate focusing upon terrorism and
possibly involving quite different institutional representatives.21 Article 86 contains
two very different embryos: one bears the EPPO as the EU’s prosecutor – protecting
this entity’s interests. The other also serves European interest but can perhaps be seen
as the logical pinnacle of member state trans-national co-operation. The potential for
both of these will be explored in what follows although it is only the former which is
currently subject to discussion.
Determining whether we need an EPPO
As has become clear, the creation of an EPPO is a legally interesting matter
and an issue of the greatest political sensitivity. This is reflected in the legal
provision made thus far which represents no more than an initial seed. In its
recent consultation of practitioners as to the potential benefits an EPPO might
have, the Commission was careful to make no mention of the expansive
possibilities of article 86 (4).22
Amongst the legal wranglings and political hyperbole of this debate, it is
easy to lose sight of what certainly should be the central issue: the question
why we might need a European public prosecutor? It is this case the European
Commission currently seeks to make in relation to the Union’s financial inter-
ests. The member states are unquestionably alert to issues of EU “competence
creep” and extremely sensitive to any notion of European institutions assuming
powers best exercised by their own authorities.23 Anyone genuinely interested in
the creation of an EPPO would be unwise to risk debate straying from core
discussion of what problems are faced and how an EPPO could provide
solutions. Only if the member states accept such arguments and an institution
of this kind as in line with the principle of subsidiarity,24 can an EPPO proposal
succeed. Extensive consultations of practitioners are already underway and are set to
form the background of any initiative tabled by the Commission in combination with
the requisite impact assessment recently assigned to a large management consultancy
firm.25
20 See van den Wyngaert, C. [31; p. 204 et seq.]
21 See e.g. this demand by Roma [40]. Only 4 years ago, a leading commentator expressed the expectation
that we may see an European Public Prosecutor with jurisdiction for terrorism-related offences sooner
rather than later – Vervaele, J. [41].
22 See < http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/criminal/opinion/120307_en.htm> for further information on
the consultation and its aims.
23 Thus note the cautious approach of the German government in reaction to the critical Bundestag and
Bundesrat [42].
24 A topic of heated discussion since the inter-governmental conference which proposed the draft Consti-
tutional Treaty – see e.g. White, S. [43; p.53]
25 Thus the consultation mentioned in footnote 23 was followed by a meeting of the Prosecutor’s General in
Brussels in June 2012.
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The EuroNEEDS project
With the aim of exploring the potential benefits to be gained from and problems
associated with a European public prosecutor, this paper outlines preliminary results
of the EuroNEEDs study. This independent academic study was carried out by the
author at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law. It was
co-financed by the Hercule Programme of the European Commission and only
feasible due to the work of a large project team.26
The study was visualised on the basis of the Hague programme, viewing the
European Union as a single area of freedom, security and justice; developments
within European criminal law as serving the purpose of providing for this. The core
hypothesis of the study is that a European area of freedom, security and justice
centrally has two requirements clearly matched to the two embryonic strands of
article 86 TFEU identified above:
i. that the interests of that Union are adequately protected throughout the Union27
and that
ii. the national borders within the Union pose no impediment to the successful
prosecution (in its broadest sense28) of crime.[15; p.11]
Requirement i. acknowledges that the area of freedom, security and justice of the
European Union must consider and protect the assets and institutions of what was
previously known as the European Communities and ensure that offences against the
Union’s interests are equally and adequately protected throughout the Union. The
EuroNEEDs study set out to establish in how far this is the case relating to the
Union’s financial interests. Given the intensity of debate surrounding this subject,
especially in this the post-Lisbon era, it was considered necessary to focus also upon
an evaluation of related reform and improvement proposals, in particular the potential
for a European public prosecutor.
Requirement ii addresses above all, the area of cross-border cooperation which has
become of central political importance since the Tampere Council.29 The study aimed
26 Consisting of: Lorena Bachmeier-Winter, Stefan Braum, Zoran Buric, Alexia Couccoullis, Valentina
Covolo, Zlata Durdevic, Ákos Farkas, Birgit Feldtmann, Jaroslav Fenyk, Jaan Ginter, Adam Gorski, Tricia
Howse, Robert Kert, Michiel Luchtman, Jussi Ohisalo, Anna Ondrejova, Andrzej Sakowicz, Valeria Scalia,
Rosaria Sicurella, Patrick De Wolf, Helen Xanthaki, Sophie Zietek, Josef Zila who respectively provided
expertise and conducted the interviews in their domestic jurisdiction.
The project was co-managed in Freiburg by the author and Ellen Weaver. The project team was
supported by student assistants who came and went in the course of the study: Daniel Hannemann, Mika
Kremer, Nevena Kostova, Jan Philipp Köster, Philip Ridder and, especially, Sarah Schultz. Many thanks are
due to all
27 As required by the famous Greek Maize judgment C-68/88 (Commission v Greece), see especially
paragraph 24 of the judgment of 21st September 1989.
28 Prosecution is meant and the word prosecutor used in a Continental sense meaning that all steps towards
lodging a criminal charge are indicated. In other words, investigative work is explored purely as part of the
broader prosecution process.
29 The Tampere Council of 1999, which launched the principle of mutual recognition in the European
criminal justice areas, can in many ways be regarded as the birthplace of European criminal justice as we
know it today [44;pp 33–37]. The principle of mutual recognition was the key feature of the European
Arrest Warrant – regarded as the most successful European criminal justice mechanism introduced thus far
[45; p.3] – and is declared the cornerstone of co-operation in criminal matters by the Lisbon Treaty – see
article 82.
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to evaluate how well the mechanisms introduced by the European Union to date have
contributed to ensuring borders pose no significant problems to criminal justice [16].
The study also considered reform proposals and further mechanisms to improve the
functioning of trans-national prosecution.
The EuroNEEDs study thus identifies two areas of criminality as of legitimate
“European” criminal justice interest namely crimes against (the financial interests of)
the EU and cross-border crime. In the EuroNEEDs analysis and what follows these are
referred to as European crimes being dealt with in European cases; intended to indicate
their scale and nature as meaning that they should be viewed of as equal concern to any
European citizen and tax payer. They are referred to as financial interest and trans-
national crimes respectively. These are crimes likely to be combatted successfully only if
a criminal justice perspective beyond the traditional, nationally-bound is assumed.
It may plausibly be argued that the EU – as a supra-national instance – has interests
beyond the collective concerns of the member states. In relation to crimes against its
budget, the EU’s interests may, in some cases, even be contrary to those of member
states. In relation to cross-border crime, the EU has sought to make provision for
comprehensive investigation and prosecution of these,30 often significantly boosting
the reach of member state action to ensure a different quality of investigation and
prosecution. The legitimacy of EU action in such contexts – as opposed to work by
any other institution negotiating trans-national treaties – is lent particularly by the
specific nature of the EU. As a supra-national governance level providing for the free
movement of goods, persons, products and capital [17], it plausibly facilitates crime
of different sorts. The member states and EU institutions are committed to ensuring
these freedoms are not abused [18]. The EuroNEEDs project design consequently
features a presumption that the EU bears a particular responsibility for combatting
crimes it facilitates as a community; it must seek to protect the legitimacy and to
avoid the abuse of its fundamental principles.
It should be expressly stated that this study views the work of defence lawyers as central
to criminal justice; thus the study also investigated in how far the jurisdictional borders
within the Union may impede defence work as usually foreseen within criminal justice
systems. As it is not key to the topic at hand, these study results are not explored in any detail
here. However, the study results clearly indicate that any development of prosecutorial
structures should be accompanied by careful consideration of necessary defence evolution.
EuroNEEDs methodology Regarding, as it did, these issues as a European matter, the
EuroNEEDs study sought to ensure the results gained are truly European. It was
therefore carried out as a comparative study; posing its question in different national
and supra-national contexts. Interviews were conducted with 132 prosecutors and 60
defence lawyers in 17 EU member states and Croatia31 as well as practitioners
working within OLAF, at Europol and Eurojust.32 Interview partners were selected
30 E.g. via Europol analysis, Eurojust support, joint investigation teams etc.
31 Currently an accession country and set to become the 28th EU member state on the 1st of January 2013.
32 In what follows, Europol, Eurojust and OLAF are described in this way regarded as criminal justice
related institutions located at the European level–for a precise analysis of Eurojust’s status see Suominen,
A,[46]; also van den Wyngaert, C. [31;p.207 et seq.]; for OLAF see Xanthaki, H. [47]
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as practitioners dealing with cases of offences against the EU budget on the one
hand and trans-national organized crime (if necessary specialized in human
trafficking, drug smuggling and corruption) on the other.33 In reality, such clean
differentiation was not always possible amongst national prosecutors. Study results
are presented to demonstrate the results from all those interviewed as well as broken
down into offences against the financial interests of the EU (hereinafter financial
interests) and trans-national crime expert groups. These specialist groups contain
only those with relevant expertise exclusively in that area meaning that their
statements can be taken as relating solely to that particular group of crimes. In
particular in relation to interviewees with financial interest expertise, this
narrowed the sample considerably; many prosecutors with expertise in this field
also have experience dealing with other trans-national crime and so their com-
ments are presented as equally applicable to both crime categories.
Practitioners were questioned as to the challenges they face when investigat-
ing and prosecuting cases with a European dimension. These were defined as
cases which either victimised the European Union (in particular via its budget
either directly or indirectly) or are trans-national crimes of concern to the EU
(as defined by EU instruments).34 In relation to the investigation and prosecution of
such offences, practitioners were further asked which of the instruments and agencies
available to them at the European level they currently use, whether they feel
anything is lacking and their attitudes to particular reform possibilities, includ-
ing the EPPO, were explored. They were questioned in accordance with a
standardized questionnaire (designed specifically for each sub-group: national
prosecutors, defence lawyers, practitioners working in supra-national settings.
The first and third featured much common ground). Interviewees were, howev-
er, always free to express their own ideas and thoughts in further comments. A
qualitative analysis of this wealth of additional material is currently underway.
The interviews were conducted in the relevant practitioners’ native tongue
though questionnaires were usually provided to interviewees in English in
advance.35 Interviewers were briefed as to the purpose of the study and the ques-
tionnaires discussed in detail with them at a preliminary project workshop to ensure
interviews were as uniform as possible.
33 For a detailed description of methodology, interviewee selection process, limitations, etc. please see the
preliminary report submitted to the European Commission: Wade [23].
34 Most comprehensively see article 83 (1) TFEU which states: “in the areas of particularly serious crime
with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to
combat them on a common basis” defining these more closely as “terrorism, trafficking in human beings
and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money
laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime.” On the
clarity provided by this see House of Lords [48; pp.142–143]. Mitsilegas notes that whilst this is an
expansion of Union/Community competence in the substantive criminal law field, it is a narrowing of scope
in comparison to previous third pillar activities – see Mitsilegas, V. [49;p.108].
35 The questionnaire for national prosecutors was designed in discussion with all project partners who also
attended a seminar to ensure all interviewers operated asking questions based on the same premise.
Interviews were usually recorded using digital voice recording devices. Where, exceptionally, interviewees
declined the recording of conversations, detailed notes were made during and post interview. Interview
results were entered by the interviewer — a project partner native in the respective member state with
expertise in European criminal law – into an internet survey tool.
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As the vast majority of interviewees were prosecutors in continental and thus
inquisitorial criminal justice systems, this sees them in charge of the investiga-
tion as well as prosecutorial decisions.36 The questionnaire was not adapted for
common law jurisdictions in which this is not formally the case as research findings
indicate a factually similar role for senior prosecutors there when working the
kinds of cases forming the study focus. Even though the law does not require
their participation in the same way, English and Welsh prosecutors for example
are consulted and play similar roles to their continental counterparts in inves-
tigations into serious crime.37
The questionnaires and ensuing interviews were clearly based upon the
presumptions outlined above and thus prominently marked by the following
premises:
1) That cases of criminal offences arise within the territory of the European
Union which affect interests fittingly described as European. This is clearly
the case where property and legal interests of the Union itself suffer
damage. Furthermore, a European interest is recognized in the effective
combatting of certain trans-national crimes as recognized by the member
states by their use of the third pillar instruments in the decade prior to the
Lisbon Treaty entering into force.
2) As the enforcement of laws against such offences still falls to the national
authorities of the member states, they face particular challenges in investi-
gating and prosecuting them. This is because such cases certainly involve
the breach of laws from another jurisdiction (EU or foreign law) and are
often of a geographical scope beyond the jurisdiction of one member state.
The existence of Europol, Eurojust and OLAF and indeed instruments
such as the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) [12] and the gestating European
Investigation Order (EIO) [19, 106] can be taken as evidence that the member
states recognize this.
Interviewees were on the whole accepting of the first premise though the
meaning attached to this naturally varied. Regarding the second premise, a
minority of interviewees, as we shall see, felt that given the institutions and
instruments made available to them via third pillar action, this was no longer
true. The vast majority, however, testified that this is, and to a certain extent
always will be, the case.
If the EuroNEEDS study is to lend any credence to the idea of an EPPO,
clearly this would require that it identified problems faced by practitioners in
dealing with European cases for which an EPPO could potentially provide
solutions.38 These are the two aspects explored in the following: Problems faced
36 Refer to Hodgson, J. [50], Tak, P. [51], Tak, P. [52], Bulenda et al. [101], Lewis, C. [53], Aubusson de
Cavarlay, B. [54], Elsner, B., Peters, J. [55], Blom, M., Smit, P. [56], Zila, J. [57] Turković, K. [58], Róth,
E.[59], Aebi, M.F., Balcells, M. [60] Gilliéron, G., Killias, M. [61], Hakeri, H. [62].
37 See Wade [63;p. 108].
38 This is, of course, the first argument made against an EPP – see e.g. Donoghue [64; p.11] One leading
commentator already declared it the theoretically more efficient option in 2005 – See van den Wyngaert,
C.[31; p.226].
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by national prosecutors when investigating and prosecuting European crimes and the
potential of an EPP to solve them
Prosecution of crime currently unpunished The most obvious problem calling for
further action and indeed the one cited by the Commission justifying their calls for an
EPPO, is the assertion that cases of serious crime currently go unprosecuted.39
Interviewees tended to be very hesitant in answering questions concerning the
current criminal justice response rate to European crimes. Above all, they highlighted
the lack of knowledge as to the dark number, i.e. extent of crime altogether. Practi-
tioners at Eurojust, Europol and OLAF (labelled supra-national interviewees in the
statistical analysis) similarly were for the most part unwilling to speculate. 27 % (8 of
30) supra-national interviewees were prepared to answer the relevant question; all
stating that only a minority of crimes against the financial interests of the EU are
successfully investigated and prosecuted. Of the 23 asked,40 22 % (5) stated that a
majority of trans-national crimes are successfully investigated and prosecuted whilst
9 % (2) claimed this was only a minority. The majority of interviewees felt unable to
answer these questions.
It is interesting to note that interviewees remained reticent in discussing criminal
justice “success” rates, also in relation to their area of expertise. One might wish to
note that those who did provide a response for crimes against the financial interests of
the EU, clearly indicate only a minority of crime is being dealt with. None of these
specialists asserted that the majority of crimes were being dealt with. This is in line
with claims consistently made by the Commission.41
Interviewees were, however, far more willing to be drawn on the trends in such
crimes with practitioners indicating that European crimes are on the increase. The
study thus shows 60 % of practitioners working in supra-national institutions
stating that they estimate European crimes being on the increase and 10 % that
their rate is stable (with the remaining 30 % not feeling able to give an estimate).
These 10 % stemmed exclusively from practitioners who are financial interest
experts. The analysis of answers related to financial interests crime sees these
practitioners (who estimate European crimes against the financial interests of the
EU as remaining stable) forming 21 %. In this specific context 50 % of interview-
ees were convinced this type of crime is on the increase with 29 % of interviewees
feeling unable to provide an estimate. No one asserted a decrease in criminal
activity.
39 See this suggested most recently in the Commission (DG Justice)’s consultation on the protection of the
European Union’s financial interests and enhancing prosecutions – http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/
criminal/opinion/120307_en.htm, but also in greater detail European Commission [65; p.5].
40 Because this question was not posed to OLAF staff who are, of course, specialists for crimes against the
EU’s financial interests.
41 One cannot, of course, exclude that such opinions are also informed by the Commission’s standpoint but
these practitioners are also in a position to form their own opinion based upon what they feel about the field
they work in. They were specifically asked for their own evaluation. There is also little indication that these
assertions are incorrect with e.g. OLAF’s latest annual report indicating that even after their investigations,
criminal justice follow-up occurs only in a minority of cases and for limited conduct (OLAF [66; p. 21 and
35]). One can only speculate what this means for the dark number.
448 M.L. Wade
Amongst the nationally-based interviewees 56 % of prosecutors felt unable to
provide an estimate as to the trend during the past years, whilst 26 % said European
crimes have been increasing and 18 % thought they had not. Related specifically to the
two distinct component strands of crime: 37 % of the national EU financial interest
experts believe these crimes to be on the increase, 29 % say they are not with only 34 %
feeling unable to provide an estimate. Relating to trans-national crime, 81 % of national
experts declared themselves unable to provide an answer to this question whilst 11 %
stated such crimes to be on the increase and 8 % that this is not the case.
Clearly this first section of study results is at best highly speculative and mostly
inconclusive. It highlights only that the knowledge basis about the types of crimes for
which the EU has introduced combatting mechanisms is unsatisfactory.42 No real
conclusions can be drawn from such a diffuse picture except that further knowledge is
needed about these criminal phenomena. The recently reformed Eurojust and Europol
legal bases clearly demonstrate the EU legislature (at the time the member states)
recognising this need. They further demonstrate the necessity of building such
understanding at a supra-national level. National criminal justice authorities are
now subject to further reporting requirements to supra-national agencies (see article
13 Eurojust Decision [20] and article 7 Europol Decision [21]). The latter should be
placed in a position to understand the European picture as a consequence. In the
medium term this should see EU agencies in a better position to inform about such
criminal phenomena and criminal justice responses to them. Should this information
shore up the speculation of EuroNEEDs interviewees that the majority of financial
interest crimes are not being prosecuted, this will clearly favour the creation of an
EPPO. If the indications relating to trans-national crime are proved correct and
national authorities are able to deal successfully with the majority of cases, then this
would speak against the need for an EPPO for these crime types.
Dedicated investigation The study hypothesis that European crimes pose problems to
prosecutors due to their specific complexities, indicates a potential benefit of an EPPO as
the specialised and dedicated investigations it could run. The challenge of European
cases is, above all, that knowledge and evidence of the criminal activity resides beyond
the borders of any one national prosecutors’ jurisdiction. The central problem is for the
prosecutor to access (and make available to the court before which s/he brings a case)
any evidence required to prove the nature and extent of criminal activity. The European
Union itself currently encompasses 29 jurisdictions,43 the border-check free Schengen
area currently has 33 members and European cases may naturally further involve
third states, meaning their coverage can be very significant indeed. Prosecutors
investigating even aspects of such cases may face very significant geographic and
jurisdictional challenges. The procurement of assistance from other jurisdictions is
thus a decisive issue.
42 See, for instance, the divergence of opinion between Petrus van Duyne and Ernesto Savona. Savona,
favours a ‘risk formulae’: see Savona, E [67]. Duyne, on the other hand, considers this approach ‘void’ due
to the lack of a valid definition in categorising such occurrences: see van Duyne P C.[68; p.63]. See also the
question and answers session highlighting Van Duyne’s views on this matter succinctly [68; p. 78ff].
43 The United Kingdom, which counts as one member state, featuring three: England and Wales, Scotland
and Northern Ireland. Croatia will become a full member of the EU on the 1st of July 2013.
A European public prosecutor: potential and pitfalls 449
National prosecutors were therefore asked about mechanisms in place to
gather evidence abroad. The vast majority reported mechanisms as being in
place and generally adequate.44 When asked about the success of such measures,
the responses presented in Figs 1, 2 and 3 resulted.
Only a small part of the study results concerning structural provision for European
cases at national level is presented here. Clearly some provision is made to assist
prosecutors in dealing with European cases and approximately one quarter of pros-
ecutors feel this provision to be adequate. This result must, however, be seen in the
study context: only prosecutors specialised in this kind of work were interviewed. It
was not possible to expand the sample so widely that prosecutors who encounter such
cases only once or twice within a career could be captured. Fundamentally, even
amongst this expert group, the study demonstrates successful investigation hinging
upon the ability and motivation of individual practitioners handling such cases. This
will in turn depend to a great extent upon the training and circumstances these
practitioners work within as determined by their sovereign nation states. Prosecutors
across Europe are widely recognised as operating under resource pressures necessi-
tating the prioritisation of those cases considered most important.45 The systems
within which prosecutors handling European cases work do not necessarily prioritise
European interests. Notwithstanding the excellent work done by many prosecutors,
also recognised by the European institutions, this naturally leaves European interests
in the hands of nationally-oriented structures operating under pressure.46
Clearly the creation of an EPPO should ensure a cadre of dedicated prosecutors
across Europe motivated to prosecute the European cases for which they are given
competence. Given the central importance of such motivation in gathering evidence
across borders, this would be a key argument for an EPPO if such motivation is
regarded as lacking.
44 See Wade, M. [23;p.24 et seq.].
45 Jehle. J., Wade. M [69]Wade. M., Jehle. J. [9], Wade [70] and Luna/Wade [71] also recognised by the
practitioners working in supra-nationalised institutions questioned in the course of the study see Wade [23;
p. 43 et seq.].
46 Thus e.g. the call by Lothar Kuhl, head of the policy department of the Anti-Fraud Office of the
European Commission (OLAF), in his plenary speech at the „Blueprint for the European Public Prose-
cutor’s Office? EU model rules of criminal procedure conference,“13–15th June 2012, in Luxembourg, that
a figure who “cares” about European interests is necessary.
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When it comes to their specific experiences in providing assistance, a majority of
prosecutors overall (just over half when analysed according to specialisation),
reported no problems in obtaining and transferring evidence abroad. 23 %, 14 %
(financial interests) and 34 % (trans-national) respectively replied that they face
complications. The difference between the low rate of problems relating to financial
crime and the relatively high rate in trans-national cases is intriguing.
This difference is also apparent in interviewee responses to whether they have ever
refused a request. The overall affirmative response rate is 36 % with a large diver-
gence between the two crime strands for which specialists were interviewed; 20 % of
financial interests experts have refused requests whilst this rate is 44 % amongst
trans-national crime specialist. It would thus certainly appear that the latter inves-
tigations witness practitioners facing greater problems. This may be due to a lesser
degree of specialisation and expertise or indeed a lack of familiarity with their foreign
counterparts. Supra-national interviewees indicated that the “financial interests
world” is one in which investigators often know each other. Only 41 of 72 inter-
viewees provided explanations why they refused requests from foreign colleagues
(see Table 1) but of these, the vast majority reported refusals as occurring for
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success?
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fundamental (constitutional) legal reasons or for more technical reasons (such as the
conditions for a measure being subject to other preconditions in that member state).
This accounted for 70.7 % of refusals. In addition 17.1 % stated requests were refused
because these were too generally formulated or considered too petty.
The reasons given for refusing requests described by financial interests experts
pointed, above all, to legal reasons with occasional remarks that requests are too
loosely formulated. A number of those negating this question (i.e. saying they have
not refused requests) point out that they have had to request additional information to
avoid refusing a request (count: 4 of 15 – 43 % of those who provided an answer). For
trans-national experts the vast majority of reasons given also related to legal bars. In
two cases (of 39 interviewees who provided the requested information as to their
reasons), however, refusal ensued because national proceedings in the requested state
were underway, a further two for capacity or policy reasons. A further two inter-
viewees stated the requested act became impossible for practical reasons.
38 % overall, 31 and 39 % respectively have experienced their own requests being
refused. Again, not all interviewees provided explanations; in this context 72 (55%) did:
practical legal issues are the dominant problem (see Table 2). Fundamental legal issues,
however, also play a role. Badly drafted requests or ones deemed not to be propor-
tionate are mentioned at the same rate by those who have experienced their requests
being rejected as those who have experience rejecting (compare Tables 1 and 2).
Financial interests experts state, above all, legal reasons as having caused refusal but
also a few cases in which their requests lacked the necessary precision. One interviewee
described a request not being performed in time. A number of these specialist inter-
viewees (7) state that their requests are not refused but point out that they are not fulfilled
at all or alternatively not fulfilled in a timely manner, meaning that the end effect is the
same. Trans-national expert interviewees similarly state formal, legal grounds as the
Table 1 National prosecutors:
Most frequent reason for refusing a
request
Fundamental legal reason 19 14.39 %
More practical legal differences 10 7.58 %
Too general/petty 7 5.30 %
Lack of resources/time 1 0.76 %
Not within the EU 1 0.76 %
Formal 3 2.27 %
No answer 60 45.45 %
Table 2 National prosecutors:
The most frequent reason own
requests are refused
Fundamental legal reason 9 6.82 %
More practical legal differences 19 14.39 %
Too general/petty 7 5.30 %
Lack of resources/time 4 3.03 %
Not within the EU 3 2.27 %
No answer 60 45.45 %
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reason for the majority of refusals; 5 of these interviewees state that they do not receive
formal refusals but experience the functional equivalent mentioned above.47
Relating to requesting transfers of evidence, the study is indicative of the kinds of
problems discussed at the European level in association with the proposal for a
European Evidence Warrant (EEW) and now the European Investigation Order
(EIO) [19, 21]. The expectation is naturally that the EIO will provide solutions to
some of these. There are clearly legal bars to the successful procurement of evidence
by prosecutors and, to a lesser extent, difficulties relating to how requests are
formulated. The nitty-gritty of transferring evidence within the EU is – albeit
exceptionally – still marked by significant problems with the law surrounding
offences against the EU’s financial interests appearing particularly problematic.
60 % of interviewees, however, state they have no problem requesting or receiving
evidence. Expert interviewees have lower rates of refusing requests. Financial interest
experts point to some very specific legal problems.48 These reports occur despite many
interviewees’ assertions that they try to check in advance whether their request is
achievable. Such refusals are, however, an exceptional phenomenon. For such cases
an EPPO operating under harmonised legal rules for evidence-gathering should
overcome both the legal and practical problems currently associated with interna-
tional evidence-gathering.
Evidence gathering is naturally not only a matter of accessing information an
investigator already knows exists but also part of a dynamic investigative process. As
such the EuroNEEDs study sought not only to measure whether prosecutors are able
to access evidence in other jurisdictions but also to understand how they believe an
investigation should ideally run.
Overall a clear majority of interviewees (66%) state that they would prefer to become
directly involved in evidence gathering abroad. 50 interviewees (37.9%) say they would
always like to be involved whilst 63 (47.7 %) only express this desire in relation to large
and complex cases. Amongst financial interests specialists this rate extended to greater
majority with 80 % (93 % of those providing an answer) expressing this preference. In
this category interviewees strongly expressed a need to accompany key stages of the
investigation themselves in order to make quick, reactive decisions as to how to proceed.
Only 6 % negate a preference to be involved. This is a case of clear divergence from
trans-national specialist interviewees of whom 28 % see no need to be directly involved
in evidence collection abroad, though a majority 59 % (68 % of those providing an
answer) still expressed a preference to so be.
Several interviewees pointed out that they are currently able to participate in
requested acts under legislation in force and do take up this option.49 There were
no reports of requests of this nature being made and then refused. The extent of
current active participation or presence is, however, not proportionate to the level of
desire expressed for this. One might speculate that resources and working practice
tend to militate against such participation being anything other than an exception.50
47 Though two indicate that the refusals they have experienced relate exclusively to non-EU member states.
48 A significant proportion of refusal reasons relate to finance-related legal problems e.g. bank secrecy 8 of
50 – so 16 %.
49 This is permitted under Article 3(1) of the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance, Strasbourg,
20.IV.1959; as well as Article 4 of the Council Act of 29 May 2000 [105].
50 4 interviewees expressly state this to be the case though interviewees were not directly questioned on this point
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Prosecutors do not express any hesitation in relation to asking for evidence from foreign
jurisdictions.51 The lack of priority or urgency with which their requests are treated (as
indicated by their statements shown supra), however, provides a hypothetical reason why
prosecutors might prefer to be involved directly in gathering evidence abroad. Investigative
tactics and the ability to react as a case develops are, however, the most frequently explicitly
mentioned reason for this by interviewees where they explained their answers.
Although national prosecutors have mechanisms at their disposal to gather evidence
in European cases, the EuroNEEDs study demonstrates that this is still far from a simple
matter and thus correctly one currently being tackled at the EU level. An EPPO with
jurisdiction to gather evidence across the Union would naturally provide a solution to
any such problems. It is not the only thinkable path to achieving efficient evidence-
gathering across the Union. Therefore whilst this is a benefit which might plausibly be
associated with the establishment of an EPPO, it alone is unlikely to be accepted as
grounds justifying the creation of such an office. The strong preference, particularly on
the part of financial interest specialists, of prosecutors to run cases personally is another
matter. This would seem to indicate very clearly that investigations are best run by the
intended prosecutor who is thus placed to develop a case dynamically. There can be no
clearer endorsement of a prosecutorial figure acting supra-nationally.
A major potential benefit of an EPPO would be to release the European dimension
of cases from their dependency upon the national level.52 For information purposes
they would presumably still rely upon the member states in parallel to article 13
Eurojust Decision [20] and article 7 of the Europol Decision [12] however the
obligations of member state authorities to report would certainly have to be strength-
ened.53 Furthermore, unlike the current situation in which Europol must ask a
member state to initiate investigations54 or a Eurojust prosecutor might ask a national
colleague to launch an investigation or prosecution55 (as indeed do OLAF), an EPP
will be able to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute in his or her own right. In
doing so the EPP would be acting as an agent of the European Union, seeking to
combat phenomena threatening European interests and values. Often this may be
subtle, but this would certainly be a different perspective from that represented even
by member state prosecutors working collectively for example in J.I.T.s. The major
point is of course that those heading the structures in which prosecutors work at
present have other priorities than the European dimension of such cases.56 Even
agencies working at the European level are bound by the will and “national agenda”
51 Of the general responses, 87 % stated themselves as happy to so. See Wade [23; p.37]. For financial
interests specialists this number is 89 %, for trans-national specialist it is 86 %).
52 Currently viewed by some as a weakness of Eurojust – see Suominen, A. [46; p.226].
53 See article rule 4 of the model procedural rules developed by the Luxembourg project ran by Ligetti [72];
the availability of information to a supra-national agency or institution was recognised as key in reforming
Eurojust’s legal basis which was intended to provide for a more pro-active work style–see European
Commission [73; p.3].
54 In accordance to article 7 of the Europol Decision [21].
55 Some, though by no means all, of the national members of Eurojust retain their powers as national
prosecutors to investigate and prosecute. This naturally depends entirely upon the member state concerned
and is reflective of the national member’s status within his or her own domestic jurisdiction not within a
supra-national order. See articles 6 and 9 (3) Council Decision setting up Eurojust [74]; as well as the
amending Council Decision [20, 103] and Wade, M. [75; II.C.2.].
56 On the separation of powers and interests to prosecute fraud against the financial interests of the EU see
Neuhann, F.[76; p.535].
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of the member states.57 An EPPO would change this and issues of delay should also
largely fall away in investigations by a suitably structured EPPO.
Comprehensive prosecution The central advantage of a supra-national office
responsible for investigation and prosecution lies in the potential to handle
cases in their full dimension; as European matters overcoming the national
boundaries which mark our current criminal justice systems. The very idea of
creating an EPPO must centrally aim to ensure the internal borders of the EU
pose no impediment to prosecuting crime, to provide for a full investigation
leading to a comprehensive prosecution and then a sentence reflective of the
criminal activity involved in its entirety.
Dealing with the European dimension The next step in attempting to gauge in how
far national systems currently charged with doing so are able to deal comprehensively
with European cases was simply to ask interviewees whether they felt hampered by
the European dimension of cases when investigating them; in other words whether
this dimension made their work significantly more difficult when compared to
national cases meaning that such cases may fail. Naturally this pre-supposes that
investigators will always be aware of the European dimension of their cases (which
may well not always be the case – see supra-nationalised practitioners opinion on this
infra). Furthermore a case being hampered does not mean it will ultimately not be
successfully investigated and prosecuted to some extent. Nevertheless, if the very fact
that a case has a European dimension, more than 10 years after the Tampere Council,
is attested as being a problem in itself and indeed as hampering (not merely compli-
cating) a case, this provides grounds to believe that national criminal justice practi-
tioners may need further assistance in dealing with such cases or that changes to the
way in which such cases are dealt with may be justified.
The majority of national prosecutors, and of the respective specialised prosecutors
interviewed, answered in the affirmative that the European dimension of such cases
hampered them in handling European cases. Of those answering no when asked this
question, many stated the word hamper as being too strong preferring to describe the
European dimension as a complication. In other words, the European dimension of
cases makes them harder for prosecutors to work. For a majority of 55 %, for
financial interest specialists 60 % and for trans-national crime specialists 58 % this
difficulty is at a level they perceive as hampering their work often to the point of
European cases failing as such. Interviewees identified several aspects of such cases
as problematic. Above all it is the practicalities of such cases which make the
European dimension a hampering factor though legal and procedural problems are
apparently not to be underestimated (see Figs. 4, 5 and 6). The study results
interestingly show a higher reporting of legal problems relating to the countering of
offences against the EU’s financial interests – perhaps indicating that this requires
particular attention. This certainly lends legitimacy to the European Commission’s
recent initiative to harmonise this aspect of substantive criminal law [22].
National prosecutorial interviewees were further questioned to what extent
the European dimension could be a bar to a case being comprehensively dealt
57 So for Eurojust see e.g. Vervaele, J. A.E. [36; p.184].
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with because, even though they recognised this dimension, they felt unable to
pursue it.
Overall 48 % stated that the European dimension is a bar to a case or forms an
aspect of cases which cannot be dealt with. In other words almost half of the national
prosecutors questioned assert that, at least sometimes, the European dimension of
cases must be left aside and an investigation focused merely upon what has taken
place upon national territory. A significant number of European cases can thus clearly
not be prosecuted as such. In cases of this kind, the full dimension of crime may well
not become known and cannot be prosecuted.58 The evaluation of specialists answers
display 52 % of trans-national cases as (at least sometimes) being restricted in their
investigative scope whilst a slightly larger majority (of 54 %) of financial interests
specialists stated this to be the case.
This point is underlined by the results of the supra-national EuroNEEDs interviews. A
clear majority − 63 % overall, 57 % relating to EU financial interest related offences – of
these interviewees express the opinion that themember states’ authorities fail to adequately
recognise the true dimensions of such crimes. This confirms that from the very outset such
crimes stand no chance of being handled as the European cases they are. Furthermore
60 % (64 % of EU financial interest specialists) identify a tendency of member states’
investigative authorities to reduce investigations to aspects of national relevance. The
supra-national interviewees thus confirm the results gained from national prosecutors,
underlining more strongly that European cases are either not recognised as such or, where
they are, the European dimension will frequently be neglected as investigators are forced
or choose to streamline their investigation. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate how prosecutors
believe the reduction of cases to aspects of national interest may be avoided.
58 One might even expect that the number of prosecutors answering this question in the affirmative is
under-representative. Several of the systems included in the study feature prosecutors bound by the
principle of legality and by an ex officio duty to investigate crimes fully and might thus be reluctant to
admit to not doing so.
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The EuroNEEDs study results therefore identify a number of points which must be
regarded as problematic from the European perspective. A majority of prosecutors testify
to being hampered by the European dimension with financial interest experts indicating
that legal complexities pose particular problems for them. Around half the prosecutors
interviewed furthermore reported limiting their case work to aspects of national relevance
meaning the European nature of cases goes neglected. Finally the study makes clear that
the pursuit of European aspects is reliant upon the efforts of individual prosecutors. This
research thus indicates that the current criminal justice response to European cases is not
comprehensive and unlikely to be consistent (dependent as it is upon national prosecu-
tors’ circumstances). Clearly in this situation comprehensive prosecution cannot ensue.
This is a clear argument supporting the need for structural change such as an EPPO. A
figure of this kind operating under harmonised definitions of financial offences should,
by its very nature (working Europe-wide) be able to guarantee full investigations not
hindered by national borders in what is investigated thereby providing the necessary
informational basis for comprehensive prosecution.59
This picture is confirmed by supra-national interviewees. Almost 60 % of supra-
national interviewees state that such cases are investigated inadequately in the
member states. Over 60 % of EU financial interest experts state this to be the case.
Supra-national interviewees were often careful to stress this is not a matter of will or
competence on the part of their member state based colleagues (9 supra-national
interviewees −30 % – expressly state that failures are due to other factors) but they
were firm in their evaluation of the result. A vast majority (83 % overall and 86 % for
EU financial interest specialists) stated that insufficient resources are available for the
investigation of such cases though other factors60 are also stated to hinder inves-
tigations. This was clearly seen to lead to inadequate prosecutions with 60 % of
supra-national interviewees, 71 % of EU financial interest specialists among them
59 This last point may be indicative of legal reform being necessary. Given, however, that the financial
regulations relating to EU funds form part of a complex and autonomous legal order, one might just as well
argue that specialist structures dealing with them would also solve this problem.
60 Such as differences in laws, a need to take new paths, a lack of training, an inability to see the full
perspective of cases and unwillingness to take cases on and deal with them in their entirety.
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Fig. 8 National financial interests prosecutors unable to pursue European dimensions: Suggestions how
this could be overcome
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confirming this. A number of respondents explained explicitly that no adequate
prosecution can follow inadequate investigation; others chose to limit their affirma-
tion of adequacy in consideration of prosecutions possible given the material provid-
ed by the investigations conducted. Clear indication is provided that the current
prosecution of European cases, particularly financial interests cases is inadequate
viewed from the European perspective provided by supra-national interviewees.
Practitioners working in supra-national institutions also clearly identify the Euro-
pean dimension as hampering investigations (60 % overall and 71 % of financial
interests experts) thus confirming the answers given by their national counterparts
(see Figs. 9 and 10). In fact, they express more strongly that this is the case. Possibly
this is due to their recognition of more cases as European than their colleagues
working in national settings. Most frequently supra-national interviewees identify
the practicalities of such cases as causing cases to be hampered. Differences in law,
bad past experiences and even the perception of complexity and indeed unwillingness
of practitioners to act because they are set in their ways, are, however, also identified
as causal problems as illustrated in Figs. 9 and 10.
It is interesting to note that inadequacies are highlighted as particularly marked in the
investigation stage. The tendency to reduce prosecutions only to matters of national
relevance is reported asmarkedly lower overall (40% compared to 60%) than in relation
to investigations. This is, however, not true in relation to the EU’s financial interest with
57 % of specialist practitioners working in supra national institutions declaring that such
reduction happens. It is important in interpreting this data to bear in mind that a majority
of 67 % and 57 % of EU financial interest specialists negate expressly prosecutors as
taking on such cases primarily when asked to do so by supra-nationalised institutions.
This demonstrates simultaneously that enforcement of the law is dependent upon
member state authorities but also that these often take such cases on upon their own
initiative. Furthermore there is some agreement that member state authorities treat
European offences with the same priority as national ones; in other words the reasons
(when this is the case) these cases are not treated entirely satisfactorily, are the same as
why complex national cases are not dealt with adequately[23; p.49 et seq.].
Interestingly agreement that there is no specific discrimination against European
cases is particularly strong amongst EU financial interest specialist, supra-national
interviewees at 64 %. Financial crimes are complex, time-consuming and resource-
intensive full stop; their investigation and prosecution generally marked by compro-
mise and inadequacy it would seem. When prosecutions of trans-national crimes are
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Fig. 9 Supra-national interviewees: Member state investigations hampered by the European dimension?
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included in the calculation, supra-national interviewees are less confident they are
treated equally with only 50 % agreeing that they are.
However, the overall figures display 27 % of supra-national interviewees contra-
dicting the majority of national interviewees’ belief that European cases are treated
with the same priority and 23 % responding they have insufficient knowledge or
providing no answer. EU financial interest specialists have more clearly formed
opinions with only 14 % not expressing an opinion and 21 % disagreeing
(vehemently) with a notion that member states protect the EU’s financial interests
as well as their own [23;52 et seq.].
Summary One can therefore note a majority of national prosecutors and a clearer
majority of prosecutors working in supra-national settings attesting to European cases
being hampered as such. Almost half of national prosecutors and a majority of supra-
national interviewees identify investigations being reduced in scope. Offences against
the financial interests are somewhat more likely to be recognised as European cases
but investigations into them are particularly liable to being reduced. They are then
disproportionately subject to reduction at the prosecution stage.
The reasons for this state of affairs lie mostly with the nature of trans-national
cases though occasionally supra-national interviewees identify the law and the
attitudes of national prosecutors as causal. The study, however, also highlights
trans-national cases as particularly in danger of being treated with lesser priority
meaning that for these crimes, the nature of criminal justice systems sometimes
speaks against their successful prosecution.
Despite their mostly positive note – that the member states do not discriminate
against enforcing the law in European cases, interviewees working in supra-national
settings (who are, after all, former national investigators or prosecutors) are fairly
unified in their assessment of the current enforcement situation as inadequate. 80 %
of supra-national interviewees overall regard the situation as less than adequate or
requiring improvement whilst not one EU financial interest specialists regards the
current scenario as adequate or better [23;42 et seq. and p.50]. As to the details of the
current set-up, a clear majority61 regard the resources devoted to these cases as
61 60 % overall −81 % of those providing answers; again Europol based practitioners remained reticent in
providing an opinion – and 71 % of EU financial interest specialists.
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inadequate. It is interesting to note that none of the interviewees in supra-national
settings attested to member state authorities decreasing in their willingness to inves-
tigate or prosecute cases [23, pp. 47 et seq.]. The problem is not fundamentally
identified as one of will it would seem; the study gives little indication of European
cases being actively discriminated against. They suffer from lack of recognition and,
amongst other things, from resource shortages.
National prosecutor interviewees agree with the supra-national interviewees’ im-
pression that the European dimension suffers at the hands of member states’ national
criminal justice systems. Within these, priority is naturally assigned to cases in the
order perceived by the member states. If member state authorities do not fully
recognise European cases – as is indicated in the analysis above, this cannot but lead
to inadequate investigations and prosecutions. Furthermore referral to resource short-
ages is frequent and this inadequate status quo is a natural consequence. The member
states have no reason to denote the resources needed to European cases as opposed to
others they view as more important.
Implications There is nothing surprising or indeed underhand about this finding per
se but the EuroNEEDS study may be taken to provide evidence to those who assert
that the member states do not protect European interests at the same level as their
own. This cannot but lead to calls for a more active, independent system or indepen-
dently resourced activity to ensure the European dimension of cases is adequately
attended to. An EPPO would from its very conception be better placed to recognise
cases as European. Any design for an EPPO not ensuring it can overcome the
practical problems currently associated with trans-national investigations and is
endowed with the legal expertise to handle financial interest cases, would defeat its
very purpose. A European public prosecutor investigating across the territory of the
Unionwould have no reason to reduce the scope of investigations and thus be well placed
to ensure European crimes are comprehensively understood and prosecuted as such.
If one interprets these results in the best possible light (and in the diplomatic spirit
with which these interviews were doubtlessly often approached), the EuroNEEDs
results can be seen as mostly exonerating the member states from any discrimination
against European cases depicting these often as the victim of structural deficiencies
(via the enforcement systems when viewed against the criminal groups and phenom-
ena concerned) and resource shortages. This lends credence to calls for new structures
and lends the argument that a system to enforce the law regulating the protection of
the EU’s financial interests could pay for itself (and should thus not be held hostage
by the member states’ resource shortages)[24; p.7] significant weight.
An EPPO operating on the territory of the EU as a whole would clearly be premised
on the idea that s/he will prosecute comprehensively.62 It should be noted that there are
two interests in comprehensive prosecution. Not only does it ensure that all victims
and interests affected are considered by a court or courts across the Union and thus
the criminal activity in all its facets responded to by criminal justice systems. Ideally
this will also ensure that sentencing reflects the extent of criminal activity.63 This will
62 On OLAF’s current inability to provide for this see Xanthaki, H. [47; p.138]. For a more detailed
overview see Xanthaki, H.[77].
63 For reflection upon appropriate sentencing see: A Ashworth and J Roberts [78; p.867].
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certainly be lost when cases are not fully prosecuted but restricted only to the interests
of one member state or evidence available in it. Proportionate sentencing may well,
however, also be lost when prosecution takes place over many member states if such
efforts are not co-ordinated and sentencing bodies made aware of convictions in other
member states. Clearly an EPPO amalgamating all activity into one case or controlling
prosecutions in several jurisdictions, would be well placed to counter such problems.
Prosecutors traditionally work in systems anchored in territorial nation states
answerable to that state’s parliament. The adoption of policies which take account
of activities threatening another sovereign might appear hostile if not done in co-
operation with and accompanied by the permission of that other nation state. If
just sentencing is an issue for more complex criminal activities transcending
borders, then those defending a traditional idea of state sovereignty64 might well
call for better information for sentencing judges and multi-lateral agreement
concerning appropriate sentencing as a promising alternative.
The majority of prosecutors interviewed in the course of the study were, however,
individuals who feel they are tasked with combatting crimes and criminals. This more
functional approach witnesses the latter unfettered by borders and prosecutorial
wishes to respond quid pro quo. As the European Union consolidates as a governance
level, prosecutors recognise a logic in assigning some responsibility to this supra-
national level. If comprehensive prosecution is strived for, and it is difficult to
imagine anyone not arguing that this should be the case for serious, organised and
cross-border crime, a well-resourced and suitably structured EPPO is undeniably well
suited to deliver this.
Efficiency/improved quality The EuroNEEDS study not only captures the facts of
European investigations and prosecutions but also explored practitioners’ opin-
ions of the developing situation. EuroNEEDS study interviewees were thus
provided with an opportunity to discuss potential reform paths. Although the
questionnaire did not explicitly refer to an EPPO, reference to a centralised
prosecution body was almost exclusively (by all but three of 162 prosecutorial
interviewees) interpreted by interviewees to mean precisely that (as opposed to
any national or even regional alternative). The interviews for this study took
place in the time period immediately before and after the Treaty of Lisbon
came into force and in which the Spanish EU Presidency and the new Euro-
pean Commission lent this topic a high profile.
Interestingly the majority of prosecutors working in national criminal justice
systems state there is no need for further mechanisms and agencies in order to deal
with European cases (62 %, 57 % among financial interests specialists and 59 % of
trans-national experts [23;p. 39]) but were surprisingly divided as to the potential
benefit of a European Public Prosecutor.
51 % of national interviewees overall stated that an EPPO would improve the
investigation and prosecution of European cases (see Fig. 11). 42 % declared that a(n
improved) support service would be preferable in a separate question (see Fig. 12).
Perhaps not entirely surprisingly the affirming majority is slightly higher for
64 The key limiting factor in European criminal justice integration/co-operation matters – see e.g. Vervaele,
J. A.E. [79; p.181]. See also p. 183 for the limiting effect of such concerns on the development of Eurojust.
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nationally-based EU financial interests specialists (54 %) and the situation is reversed
for trans-national specialist national interviewees (amongst whom 47 % believe an
EPPO would improve the situation). Interestingly amongst EU financial interests
specialists, 49 % of national interviewees state that a support service would be
preferable and adequate whilst amongst trans-national specialists this is 47 %.65
National interviewees recognise the potential benefits of an EPPO though many of
them would prefer a support service, usually developed further than what is currently
in place.
As is consistent with other responses, supra-national interviewees were more
clearly supportive of an EPPO potentially improving the investigation and prosecu-
tion of European cases with 57 % stating this. In relation to EU budget cases, i.e. the
introduction of an EPPO solely to deal with financial interest offences, this was
a more convincing 67 %. Supra-national interviewees were, however, in part
hesitant to answer this question emphasising the political nature of such a
decision. Even amongst those affirming the improvement such a move would
bring, a few interviewees were careful to emphasise that the final decision will
not be made on this kind of factual basis and that there are good reasons for
this. A larger number (11 so 36.7 %) were, however, adamant as to the need
for an EPPO. A majority (57 %) also explicitly rejected the idea of even an
improved support service as preferable to an EPPO.
Amongst supra-national interviewees specialised in dealing with EU financial
interests related cases, this standpoint was vastly clearer. The greater majority of
79 % state the need for an EPPO, whilst 86 % do so specifically for EU budget cases.
86 % also reject an even improved support service as preferable. Particularly in
relation to EU financial interests, a certain degree of impatience was detectable
amongst this group of interviewees with several of them explaining that attempts
have been made over decades to deal with European cases in a co-operative setting
and that this is simply insufficient.
65 The Luxemburg report expresses clear puzzlement on practitioners’ behalf as to the suggestion of a
European public prosecutor noting that there are feelings it is based upon a political lobbying for a
European jurisdiction and a political rather than judicial need. Whilst an exploration of this topic is not
excluded, many practical concerns are expressed above all a lack of clarity in competence definition and the
fact that a European public prosecutor would need to plead before national courts but be far removed from
national practice thus lacking acceptance and legitimacy–Braum [80; p. 16–7]. The opinions of Luxem-
bourg prosecutors are integrated into the overall figures wherever possible although they had to be gathered
in a different manner to other countries. For an explanation of the particular methodology used there see
Wade, [23;p.8]
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investigation/prosecution unit be assigned exclusive jurisdiction for such cases?
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A majority of national prosecutors and of those working in supra-national settings
thus recognise an EPPO as providing for greater efficiency and a higher quality of
investigations and prosecutions. This recognition is heightened amongst financial
interests specialists and particularly strong amongst those at the supra-national level,
lending weight particularly to the arguments for an EPPO in relation to financial
interest offences. These findings are explored in greater detail below.
The need for greater efficiency and improved quality Determining the need for any
particular kind of further development of the European criminal justice system
on an empirical basis is a complex matter. The questions underlying this study
are highly political, the interviewees involved well aware of this, as well being
of differing opinions, experiences, age and nationality, etc. There is much room
for argument, for interpretation, for questioning whether certain answers are not
coloured by a political or even emotional leaning, let alone an opinion expected
by their professional hierarchy. For this reason interviewees were led through a
series of questions which in some cases approached a singular problem or
complex from a number of different perspectives. In the cross-referencing
analysis which follows the consistency of interviewee answers is tested, helping
to draw a clearer picture of the problems faced by criminal justice practitioners
and the solutions they view as potentially promising.
The first major point to highlight is that 31.8 % (42 of 132 national prosecutorial
interviewees − 22 financial interests specialists) indicate that they have no problems
in the day to day handling of European cases. In other words a significant majority of
68.2 % of the nationally-based prosecutors interviewed within the course of the study
see themselves facing specific problems relating to these kinds of cases.
Deeper analysis of these interview results show that of those 42 who claim not to
experience any problems themselves, 32 (12 of whom are financial interests special-
ists), still call for further development at the EU level. 18 interviewees (including 7
financial interest experts) express support for an EPPO, 3 (1) further say such an
office would be an improvement though they would prefer a support service. The
remaining 11 (4 financial interest experts) see potential improvement in individual
EU measures such as those suggested by the study questionnaire (which were
centralisation of information and or evidence and a central service organisation to
organise coercive measures to provide for evidence requests, etc. [23; p.132 et seq.]).
The apparent contradictory call for further, and indeed strong institutionalisation
(although these prosecutors claim not to face any of the problems identified by the study)
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Fig. 12 National prosecutors: Whether a support service would be preferable/adequate?
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is explained by statements that these interviewees do not face the problems
themselves, but know they hinder other colleagues; that they can only not
report such problems because of the significant efforts they make to overcome
them or that the current enforcement system is fragmented and much too slow.
In other words the bar the study questionnaire set (“hampering”) in discussing
problems with European cases was a high one. Therefore, although these
interviewees negated the question as asked by the study, the majority of them
regarded European cases as marked by particular challenges and these chal-
lenges as justifying further institutional development at the European level.
Seen from the opposite perspective, only 7.6 % of interviewees (10) report having
no problems dealing with European cases or seeing no benefit from further enhancing
the institutional provision for combatting such crimes at the European level. This
leaves 92.4 % who declare themselves to be facing hampering problems or desiring
supra-national development.
Of those who report facing problems, however, 8 advocate no further develop-
ment. Four of these identify their problems as relating to practicalities, resources and
differing attitudes – matters which they do not believe can be addressed by structural
reform. Four state that the system is essentially working as it should be. One
prosecutor states that reducing the scope of cases is part of his job and should not
be viewed as problematic, another that any decisions as to development are for the
Attorney-General to make. A further response was that cases are not started “if they
are doomed” but recognises no need to change this situation.
In conclusion: 13.6 % of the nationally-based prosecutor sample are against further
developments at the European level either because they feel they face no problem
when dealing with such cases or because they view the system they work in, whatever
faults it may have, as working satisfactorily.
If we turn to the 114 nationally based interviewees who have suggestions as to
how to solve their problems or see need or potential for improvement by change at the
European level, 47 (35.6 % of the complete sample) of 132 unequivocally believe an
EPPO would improve the situation. A further 18 (13.6 % of the sample overall)
believe an EPPO would help improve the situation but would prefer a support service
to be used. Of these 65 (49.2 % of the entire sample who believe an EPPO would
represent an improvement), only four (3 % of the sample overall, 6.2 % of those who
believe an EPPO would represent an improvement) state that an EPPO’s powers
should be restricted to protecting the EU’s financial interests. 36 (of the 114 who
desire further development − 27.3 % of the sample overall) state that a support service
is what is needed (and an EPPO is out of the question). Only 4 of these expressly state
that the status quo is adequate whilst more explicitly add that Eurojust must be given
further powers for the current set-up to suffice. There is clearly disagreement as to
how criminal justice should develop at the European level: centring around a supra-
national prosecutor or in co-operative guise.
In relation to the area for which an EPPO is likely to be proposed in 2013: the
protection of the financial interests of the EU, the EuroNEEDS study identified 35 of
the nationally-based prosecutorial interviewees as pure financial interest experts (a
further 30 also deal with such cases but their opinions could not be assigned
exclusively to experience from such cases so they were only evaluated as part of
the overall results unless this is explicitly stated to be otherwise. They are considered
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in the following calculation). 13 of these 35 EU financial interest offences experts
declare themselves supportive of an EPPO (this is 37.1 % of financial interest experts,
which represents 9.8 % of the sample overall), a further 7 (20 % and 5.3 %
respectively) believe an EPP would improve the situation but would prefer a
European support service to be installed. Of the 30 who also deal with financial
interest crimes, 11 (36.7 % of this category of prosecutors, 8.3 % of the sample
overall) are supportive of an EPP whilst 3 (10 % and 2.3 % of the sample
overall) believe an EPP would improve the situation but prefer a European
support service. In other words, of those who have experience dealing with
financial interest crimes 52.3 % (25.8 % of the sample overall) believe an EPP
would improve the situation though 15.4 % (7.6 % of the sample overall) of
those calculated into this percentage state that they would prefer an improved
support service. Support for an EPPO amongst those dealing with financial
interests crimes (here defined more broadly) is thus somewhat higher than the
entire sample average of 49.2 % whilst preference for a support service is
significantly lower than the 42.2 % calculated overall. This latter figure in the
overall sample (the 42.2 %) naturally includes the interviewees who do not
view an EPP as a potential improvement, i.e. those viewing a support service
as the only viable option.
The picture of opinion relating to an EPPO is thus divided and complex. Dis-
cussions with practitioners working European cases at the national level leave no
doubt, however, that action is needed to improve the efficiency and quality of
criminal justice responses to European crime.
Initial conclusions
The EuroNEEDs study provides indications of specific problems associated
with European cases which an EPPO should be better placed to deal with
than national prosecutors. It can therefore be used to address the calls for
proof associated with criticism of the EPPO idea.66 Expert practitioners speak
less of matters such as improved co-ordination of cooperation mechanisms or a
denationalised approach to prosecution. The benefits they associate with an EPPO
relate more to concrete factors such as recognition of the full dimensions of a case and
the benefits of one person bearing responsibility for an investigation with that person
overseeing and actively leading the collection of all relevant evidence as the case
develops.
The EuroNEEDs study thus indicates that the creation of an EPPO is not
merely to facilitate greater efficiency in what is currently done. This argu-
ment has traditionally been advanced in its favour67 and should, of course, be a
factor68 but the study’s data draw attention to a more fundamental shift to be achieved
66 See e.g. Hecker, B. [81; p.513]; and rightly demanded by those anticipating/measuring the democratic
and constitutional costs of such an institution – see Braum, S. [80; p.511]
67 E.g. by the Commission’s Green Book on criminal law protection of the financial interests of the
Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor [8; p.76]and strongly criticised as a primary
goal which leaves many substantive arguments in its wake – see e.g. Braum, S. [80]
68 Identifying the laborious nature of MLA as a key factor. See Radtke, H. [82; p.9]
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by such an office: the combatting of crime in the European, not national, public
interest.
Reservations and pitfalls
The very idea of a European perspective or public interest in the prosecution of
crime, goes to the heart of one major policy battlefield; the question whether
the member states want to acknowledge the existence of any such thing via a
criminal justice office. The decision to create an EPPO or not thus goes to
deeper governance issues. The central question is whether the European dimen-
sion of cases is important enough to recognise a European pubic interest in full
investigation leading to comprehensive prosecution.
Fundamentally this is, of course, a political decision. In the coming year
politicians will have to decide how far any European public interest goes.69 Is
there any interest in combating crime greater than the sum of member state interest?
Does this require the creation of a supra-national criminal justice agency as the
European Commission looks set to argue? Some member states will doubtlessly
insist that the principle of subsidiarity70 requires the Union to allow the member
states criminal justice systems to protect the former’s interests. In relation to the
financial interests of the Union, the Commission is making the argument that decades
of inadequate protection demonstrate this is not enough.71 The practitioners inter-
viewed during the course of the EuroNEEDS study indicate this to be true. The study
also demonstrates some criminal phenomena as requiring combatting in a way
which exceeds the interests of the member states, even when working collec-
tively as currently provided for, because they require a different level of
recognition and specifically dedicated investigation. The current ability of crim-
inal justice systems to respond to some crime is portrayed as less than satisfactory.
Whilst some problems may be particularly acute for financial interests offences,
trans-national crimes also leave national prosecutors facing significant challenges.
The current situation sees national prosecutors positioned as relatively dis-
tanced service-providers to their colleagues abroad in European cases. This
appears problematic given the strong desire to be directly involved in evidence
gathering voiced by national prosecutors (38 % stating cases would run better if
this were so, 80 % amongst financial interest specialists). There would thus
certainly appear to be a need felt by practitioners to see – at least a significant
proportion of their cases – run during investigations by the person who identifies
with the case as a whole and can decide how to develop it as new facets emerge
across Europe. Prosecutors are, however, the agents of criminal policy and not
those who set it. What is then the nature of the European public interest
expressed by the criminal justice related policies of particularly the last decade?
69 This remains very much as summarised by Costa, J. [83; p.149].
70 As anchored particularly in article 5 but also in substance in article 4 of the post Lisbon TEU.
71 See e.g. Commission of the European Union [65; p.5]The OLAF Report 2011 [66; p.35]
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Does the European Arrest Warrant merely represent a mutated form of mutual
legal assistance (firmly in nation state hands) or is it the expression of a need for
a new criminal justice order? In creating a European Arrest Warrant did the
member states not express a European public interest in ensuring freedom of
movement rights are not exploited? Or should this be qualified merely as a
collective expression of national public interest? Did the Schengen accord in fact
signal the dawn of a new approach to territory and law enforcement within it? Is
there any interest in ensuring that European cases are recognised as such and
investigated and prosecuted accordingly?
Considering what is at stake, there can be little doubt that arguments against an
EPPO will be forceful. It cannot be ignored that the EuroNEEDs study also supplies
data which provide the basis for arguments against its introduction at this time.
A premature development Even a preliminary analysis of the EuroNEEDS results
also demonstrates that practitioners feel there is room for improvement within the
current scenario (see Figs. 13 and 14).
One might conclude from these indications that further institutional development
at this point would be premature72 because until the mechanisms in place are being
used properly and fully, one cannot truly determine the necessity of any further
reform. The principle of subsidiarity can be argued to require the Union to allow
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Fig. 13 Supra-national interviewees: What could be improved?
72 As suggested e.g. by Hecker [81; p. 514].
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the member states to try all other mechanisms until these are demonstrated to be
inadequate. If practitioners report that there is significant room for improvement in the
current system, any inadequacies identified can be taken to indicate a need for training
and information but not institutional reform. The EuroNEEDs statistics do, however,
also pertain to aspects which may be difficult to improve upon. When supra-national
interviewees explain that the attitude national prosecutors have to supra-national insti-
tutions requires attention (their willingness to use EU institutions is illustrated as having
the highest potential for improvement both overall and by financial interests experts),
this can just as easily be regarded as indicative of a need for fundamental change in the
prosecution set up as a need to influence and train prosecutors.
Whilst the Commission may be entirely justified in asserting that the creation of an
EPPO is in line with the principle of subsidiarity – the holy cow of Union law and
strongly reasserted by the member states in the Lisbon Treaty73– pointing to the
member states’ failure over decades to provide equivalent, proportionate and effective
sanctions74 in response to offences against its budget, the study results do lend
themselves for counter-argument. The EuroNEEDS results clearly point also to the
possibility of redoubling efforts to ensure national authorities use the support insti-
tutions currently available to them at the supra-national level. Furthermore Europol
and Eurojust operate on the basis of fairly recently reformed legal bases which are
once again subject to on-going reform negotiations.75 Member states which prefer
the investigation and prosecution of European cases to take place via such
mechanisms cannot but argue that such reforms should be allowed time to bed
down and their effectiveness then be assessed before further reform is
73 See e.g. articles 4 and 5 TEU.
74 Case 68/88, Greek Maize, [1989] ECR 2965–In this classic case the ECJ asserted in the 1980s that the
member states are obliged to protect Union (then Community) interests as their own.
75 This point was made e.g. by the German legislature see [42; p.2].
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Fig. 14 Supra-national interviewees – financial interests: What could be improved?
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undertaken.76 This argument carries particular weight if the proposed next step is the
creation of a truly supra-national criminal justice institution, which is perceived as
encroaching so strongly on the sovereignty of member states.
As supportive as they were of an EPPO, the opinions of interviewees in supra-
national institutions could be taken in part to underline this:
As demonstrated in Tables 3 and 4 significant proportions of the practitioners in
supra-national institutions interviewed think existing tools can be used better and that
simplification, training and closer member state cooperation could improve the
situation. This is part tallies with the opinions of national prosecutors illustrated in
Figs. 7 and 8 supra. Legal reform is also regarded as bearing potential by a significant
number of interviewees.
Interestingly the potential for improvement by such means is, however, not
recognised by financial interests experts. The only improvement suggestions
garnering a clearer level of support (just under 30 % – see Table 4) relate to the
supra-nationalisation of investigative and prosecutorial powers. Thus although the
study points to remarkable similarity between financial interest and trans-national
crimes in terms of the challenges faced by prosecutors dealing with them, the
practitioners working at supra-national level interviewed felt more can be done in
relation to trans-national crime within the bounds of mechanisms currently available
than is the case for financial interest crimes.
Arguments for delaying any decision regarding an EPPO except for financial
interests offences are strengthened by a majority (57 %) of supra-national interview-
ees stating that national authorities already have adequate tools to deal with European
cases. Interviewees often bemoaned the main problem as being that they do not use
them. Only amongst the financial interest expert interviewees was a larger number of
practitioners (precisely 50 %) to be found asserting that the national authorities lack
something as opposed to a minority of these experts who view the tools available as
adequate. The will of member state authorities (and how open to influence this is) will
76 See e.g. Brady, H. [84] and Donoghue [64; p.11]. Also comments on the introduction of OLAF, Europol
and Eurojust in 2003 but with equal application, given reforms and new mechanisms – Saetzger, A. [85;
p.138].
Table 3 Supra-national interviewees: How could matters be improved?
Legislative reform 7 23.33 %
harmonisation ( theory) 5
national legislation 2
Investigate at EU level 4 13.33 %
Bring cases at EU level 4 13.33 %
Better use of existing tools 4 13.33 %
Simplification 3 10.00 %
Training 3 10.00 %
Closer co-operation with member states 3 10.00 %
Policy setting at EU-level 1 3.33 %
No answer 4 13.33 %
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potentially form a great part of any coming debate. Supra-national interviewees in the
EuroNEEDs study indicate the crux as fundamentally national versus EU interests and
that the workings of national systems cannot be easily geared towards the latter. Thus
they testify to the necessity of an EPPO. The counter-argument is obvious and not new
with the central question thus becoming how long the member states can require the EU
to wait patiently for improvement.
Such a result cannot but indicate the potential for controversy. Those who
are less favourably disposed to an EPPO might well argue that encouragement
and empowerment of practitioners to use the tools at their disposal to deal with
European cases is what is required.77 Those supportive of an EPPO may well point
to efforts having been made in this direction and perhaps to the fact that the attitudes
of nationally-based criminal justice practitioners are marked by the priority afforded
these cases by their systems. The supra-national interviewees in the study indicate
the inadequacy of the resources at the disposal of such practitioners. In relation to
the financial interests of the European Union, these interviewees were certainly
making a case that what is missing is an EPPO; a criminal justice figure with the
necessary overview of European criminal phenomena as well as the knowledge
and resources to combat this successfully. These is a case which will nevertheless
have to be made politically.
Perhaps not surprisingly the study’s nationally-based interviewees are markedly
more conservative across the board than their colleagues working in supra-national
settings. Overall and among EU financial interests specialists 26 % of national
interviewees declared further mechanisms or agencies to be necessary, amongst
trans-national specialist interviewees this was 25 %. A clear majority (of 62 %,
57 % and 59 % respectively) explicitly negated any such need.
It should be noted, however, that 28 (or 21 % of the sample overall and
34.1 % of those answering this question with no), went on to qualify their
statement. Having declared that no further mechanism is necessary, they
nevertheless explained that the situation could be improved by an EPPO, the
77 In the past not only the interface between national authorities and supra-national institutions was
criticised but also the obstacles to effective co-operation between those institutions themselves, see e.g.
White, S. [86; p.82–83]. Study interviewees working in OLAF, Europol and Eurojust often spoke also of
the efforts being made to optimise these working relationships.
Table 4 Supra-national interviewees financial crimes: How could matters be improved?
Legislative reform 3 21.43 %
harmonisation ( theory)
Investigate at EU level 4 28.6 %
Bring cases at EU level 4 7.14 %
Better use of existing tools 1 7.14 %
Simplification 1 7.14 %
Training 1 7.14 %
Closer co-operation with member states 1 7.14 %
Policy setting at EU-level 1 7.14 %
No answer 1 7.14 %
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centralisation of information and evidence and/or a central EU service to apply
to for all evidence from coercive measures in all 27 member states. In other
words a slim majority of 54 % underlined that the situation would be im-
proved by further institutional development (see supra under “The need for
greater efficiency and improved quality”).78
An unworkable model? Whilst the EuroNEEDS study clearly points to issues
which might be resolved by a European Public Prosecutor and indeed demon-
strates a very significant level of support for such an institution amongst the
professionals currently tasked with this kind of work, the opposition it demon-
strates cannot be ignored. Even if the political case for a European Public
Prosecutor is made and it is structured suitably (a matter which also represents
a formidable challenge; this is an office to potentially cover a territory of over
4 million square kilometres and a population of 495 million people79), an EPPO
cannot work in isolation. 49 % of national prosecutors rejected the idea that the
investigation and prosecution of European crimes would be improved by an EPPO
and even amongst financial crime experts this was 46 %. 27 % of the sample as a
whole is vehemently opposed the idea of an EPPO. As illustrated above, of those who
viewed an EPPO as potentially improving the situation, 15 % prefer a support service,
in part citing reasons relating to acceptance by colleagues who oppose a supra-
national institution. Even an EPPO introduced to protect the financial interest of the
EU faces significant hostility from the very start.
There are other indicators of difficulty, however. Supra-national interviewees
were, for example, also asked whether they estimate member state authorities as
preferring certain types of mechanisms to facilitate their cases and as to what kinds of
assistance national criminal justice practitioners turn to them for. They responded that
member state authorities have clear preferences. 23 %80 state the latter as tending to
prefer direct contact amongst the member state authorities or mechanisms which
leave them in charge rather than transferring power to a supra-national level. The
same proportion point to a preference of paths familiar to their national colleagues
and which they have experienced as successful in the past; efficiency, freedom from
bureaucracy and not challenging the national prosecutors’ authority are also criteria
mentioned (see Tables 5 and 6). Financial interest experts are significantly more
interested in gaining direct access to their colleagues (perhaps reinforcing the over-
whelming desire to control evidence collection demonstrated by the equivalent
national interviewees). Such preferences are not easy bedfellows for a supra-
national authority.
The requests directed to supra-national interviewees are most frequently for legal
expertise, practical intervention, advice, co-ordinated action and the acceleration of
mutual legal assistance requests (see Fig. 15). Interestingly there was no general
agreement amongst supra-national interviewees as to what is working particularly
well in co-operation with the member states just as there is great variety in their
opinions as to what could be improved and how. Above all they appear to view
78 Wade [23; p.111–112].
79 http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/living/index_en.htm
80 incorporating two further comments.
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themselves as working well in connecting professionals and facilitating co-operation.
None of these findings contradict the need for an EPPO, they are, however, indicative
of difficulties such an office may face in its daily work if it wrestles with prosecutors
for control of cases.
The study demonstrates practitioners working at national and supra-national
levels increasingly interacting with one another [23; p.47 et seq. and p.89]. The
results, however, also indicate national criminal justice professionals as preferring
and using mechanisms which leave them in charge of the process in particular
in relation to trans-national crimes. Clearly this must raise concerns as to how
well an EPPO will be accepted and whether the national prosecutors s/he works
with are likely to be co-operative. No matter how well resourced the EPPO is,
it will still have to work in co-operation with and to a large degree with
Table 6 Supra-national interviewees, financial crimes: MS authorities prefer certain types of co-operative
mechanisms
Answer Count Percentage
Direct contact 5 35.71 %
Co-ordinated action 0 0.00 %
Other 8 57.14 %
Of which: familiar (used before) 3 21.43 %
Of which: familiar (in sense of language/equal) 3 21.43 %
Of which: successful before 0
Of which: unbureaucratic 1 7.14 %
Of which: not challenging user authority 1 7.14 %
No (N) 1 7.14 %
Don’t know (D) 0 0.00 %
Table 5 Supra-national interviewees – MS authorities prefer certain types of co-operative mechanisms
Answer Count Percentage
Direct contact 5 16.67 %
Co-ordinated action 0 0.00 %
Other 17 56.67 %
Of which: familiar (used before) 6 20 %
Of which: familiar (in sense of language/equal) 4 13.38 %
Of which: successful before 2 6.67 %
Of which: unbureaucratic 2 6.67 %
Of which: not challenging user authority 2 6.67 %
No (N) 4 13.33 %
Don’t know (D) 4 13.33 %
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dependency upon national criminal justice systems.81 The fact remains nevertheless
that an EPPmay well not be able take over the majority of cases and must thus develop a
suitable structure. One potential model perhaps is the Italian anti-mafia prosecution
structure which sees a very powerful central body always with the potential to take over
any case usually remaining in the background so that, in fact, successful policy still
depends upon regional and local prosecutors [25]. Clearly such issues would have to
form the second tier of considerations for an EPPO; if and when the considerable first
hurdle has been passed. A lack of acceptance or a sense of encroachment on the side
of national prosecutors would seriously undermine any potential efficacy of an EPPO.
The status quo is quite plainly that the prosecution of European cases is largely
dependent upon the will, skill and action of national criminal justice practitioners and
that, to a certain extent, also appears to be how they like it.
If steps are taken to develop an EPPO, they must be taken in recognition that this is
a controversial institution in criminal justice contexts alone. In other words, even
amongst the specialist practitioners who recognise the problems they and their
colleagues face in dealing with European crimes, there is significant opposition to
the idea of an EPPO. Broader political contexts are likely to be more and not less
concerned with e.g. the issues of sovereignty which sometimes underlie this opposi-
tion.82 This study is of course concerned with the practitioner view and opposition in
this particular context may stem from context-specific factors such as a fear of
81 At best structures similar to the cartel enforcement bodies might be achieved meaning the Union body
determines the spread of caseload. As the Commission argues that effective and dissuasive sanctioning can
only be achieved via even-handed and comprehensive prosecution [65; p.5], it is clear that the EPPO must
operate within a web of national enforcement agencies not only feeding it cases but also prosecuting cases it
cannot deal with itself.
82 See e.g. Mitsilegas who describes the E.P.P. as “perhaps the most contested issue in the development of
EU criminal law in recent years” – Mitsilegas, V. [49; p.229]. Interestingly in its famous Lisbon Treaty
judgment the German Constitutional Court has laid less emphasis on institutional development than on
substantive law – see Suhr, O. [87; p.706 et seq.].
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Fig. 15 Supra-national interviewees: MS authorities usually contact with request for
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additional work or ones authority being challenged. This view should, however, be as
strongly formed by factual arguments as it can be. Amongst the practitioners who
deal with European cases, an EPPO has strong support but it is also the subject of
clear rejection from significant sections of this community. The reasons for opposi-
tion are difficult to fathom; doubtlessly some of it is politically based but it is clear
also that some practitioners feel strongly that they and the national systems can and
should cope. Any structures establishing an EPPO; the how of an EPP installation83
and indeed the who are likely to be crucial issues [see 107]. If they are not handled
well, an EPPO can be unworkable for a multitude of reasons which cannot be
explored within the remit of this article. Significant challenges are, however, seem-
ingly inevitably to be faced in establishing the necessary co-operation with national
prosecutors. Precisely this cooperation is of course vital for a functioning EPPO.
Reconciling the EuroNEEDS results
It is not entirely simple to draw policy conclusions from this analysis. Taken together with
the results discussed above, the cautious study finding that an EPP bears potential to
improve the currently unsatisfactory solution but will face an “uphill battle” establishing
itself amongst national prosecutors is confirmed. One thing is, however, indisputable:
practitioners working on European cases in the member states require further resources
and support mechanisms to improve their handling of these cases. The consolidation of
institutions and mechanisms introduced so far as foreseen by the Stockholm programme
[15; p.20], would clearly assist practitioners in identifying which channels and
mechanisms to use. Increased use of the facilities already at their disposal will benefit
European cases. Further mechanisms are, however, necessary to overcome the main
hurdles faced by prosecutors handling them. Whether such further institutions should
be supra-national is often presented as a matter of faith.
Those who deny the need for any further development at the European level captured
in this study, for the most part do not assert that European cases are fully investigated and
prosecuted. They observe criminal justice systems to be working correctly. European
cases falling foul of practical hindrances or prosecuted only in so far as they relate to the
interest of the sovereign state in which the prosecution takes place is the logical
consequence of the residence of power with nation states.84 One must surely legiti-
mately ask whether this is correct in the Europe in which national criminal justice
systems bow to the assumed mutual trust between the member states which underlies
the “cornerstone” of police and judicial co-operation; the Europe in which free
movement is a fundamental right? Is this truly a Europe of the nation state? From
another perspective one must equally question whether this is an acceptable approach
in combatting such crimes. Our focus is serious, cross-border, organised crime.
83 On potential for this see Nieto, A. et al [88]. For initial ideas see Espina Ramos, J.A./I. Vicente Carbajosa
[16]; Satzger, A. [89; p.159 et seq.].
84 Overall 29 national prosecutorial interviewees state that reducing the scope of cases is part of their
normal work. Of these two state it is a rare and a third that this is for pragmatic, tactical reasons e.g. to allow
the disruption of criminal activity. A further 3 interviewees appear to agree with this stance as part for their
work whilst a further two, and another partially, see problems described as hampering European cases in a
similar light.
A European public prosecutor: potential and pitfalls 475
Crimes which nation states have willingly made the subject of trans-national law and
(particularly post-Lisbon) the supra-national law of the EU. Is not the very heart of
justice and home affairs policy of the EU that national borders should pose no
impediment to prosecution? Allowing them to is certainly not conducive to the EU
as a single legal area85 let alone a European public interest.
Many of those answering these questions within the course of the Euro-
NEEDS study view matters from a national perspective marked by particular
experience. In the last decades, the common experience of most European
prosecutors (prosecutors in sovereign states across Europe) has been that of
system change allowing the non-prosecution of petty crimes in order to reserve
sufficient resources for serious cases [9]. Some EU member states have, however,
rejected such a notion as unsuitable and indeed immoral.86 The move to reduce the
number of cases criminal justice systems respond fully to is unquestionably a
fundamental policy decision; a decision not to invest as many resources as it takes
to deal with all crimes — a question of social balance, in other words. The decisions
of member states to be selective in their prosecutions, does not necessarily colour, let
alone pre-form, that of the European Union. As has been stated in other contexts, the
EU represents a unique governance level for which much can certainly be learned
from its member states but, ultimately nothing can be seen as a predicating exam-
ple.87 Alone the diversity of the member states on such issues calls the EU to review
the situation in its own right.
The EU and any emerging European criminal justice system is not at a stage
at which it must begin defining principles to reduce the reach of its criminal
justice system for pragmatic reasons. If anything, this ‘system’ is at the stage of
defining itself and its reach altogether. While it is wholly rational and indeed
reasonable that national prosecutors accept limitations to their work as a given in
the current atmosphere of resource scarcity (and indeed as prescribed to them by
their respective system contexts), it is legitimate to suggest a different perspective
for the EU. It is submitted, for example, that the EU must not accept national
practitioners’ view that what they are doing (e.g. in relation to limiting the scope
of cases) is correct. Any European criminal justice system is (and should be) set
to deal only with a far more limited range of serious offences. Given this
limitation, it is submitted that parallels to the workings of national criminal
justice systems may be misleading. An independent decision must be made
concerning which resources are made available to this system. Any priority
setting to accommodate resource restrictions should be undertaken within the
logic of the system when it is conceived or as necessary, not from the outset
by those who would deny the existence of the system altogether.
Relating to the financial interests of the EU; the matter of immediate concern to an
EPPO debate, the resource shortage argument is even less credible as such an office
might conceivably pay for itself. Unquestionably there is a serious consideration as to
the coherence (and legitimacy) of criminal justice systems in which crimes are
85 As it is declared to be e.g. by the Stockholm Programme see: European Council [102; p.4]
86 See e.g. Belgium – Finjaut [90] and Spain – Aebi/Balcells [60].
87 Demonstrating that fundamentals like democratic legitimacy must also be interpreted differently in this
context see von Bogdandy, A. [91; p.47 et seq.]. For an earlier take, e.g. Carter, C. and Scott, A. [92].
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prosecuted more comprehensively because these processes pay for themselves.88 If
this office, however, forms the singular exception (see article 325 TFEU) discussed
for the EU – i.e. is the sole supra-national criminal justice institution, then this is
indeed a special case. It should perhaps not be burdened with the resource (and
coherence) argument faced in national systems.
A separate debate (and one currently explicitly not sought by EU institutions as the
Commission focuses upon the above) relates to serious cases of organised and trans-
national crime. Here too parallels to national cases may be misleading. The latest studies
on prosecution policy indicate that the trend to drop cases does not extend to serious
cases such as those of serious, organised crime but, above all, that such resource-saving
measures are undertaken, to allow for full prosecution of precisely these types of
crimes.[25]. Careful further research is necessary to compare European cases to
equivalent national ones. Consideration should be given to the acceptability of
disregarding aspects of such cases and their failure for legal or practical reasons.
Indications are that most EU member states would view a case having trans-national
dimensions, especially where these are considerable, as more and not less serious; as
deserving of greater not lesser resources.89
As Europol and Eurojust interviewees are careful to point out, national practi-
tioners currently make decisions (as best they can) on an incomplete informational
basis. The latter themselves (and indeed judges when determining sentence) would
view these type of offences differently if fully informed. Due to their severity, these
crimes – carefully and thus restrictively defined, may well be the very ones normally
lent priority at national level (at least in part); given greater resources in order to
ensure comprehensive prosecution and punishment. The question whether this should
not necessarily occur at the European level remains key. As precisely such relocation
to the European level is, however, what is apparently required to discover the full
extent of such crime, this provides one strong argument in favour of such develop-
ment.90 This is a complex debate and should certainly be undertaken entirely sepa-
rately to any debate concerning the development of mechanisms to protect the
Union’s own property interests. It is, however, also a debate concerning European
cases; crimes facilitated by the EU and in which all EU citizens have an interest in
prosecution. As such, these crimes are possibly a legitimate subject for a European
criminal justice system and not merely national co-operation.91
88 Hassemer [93; p.307] observes drily that security and effectiveness are preferred to freedom: “the foci of
the new European criminal law lies in the strengthening of criminalisation and control, they are biases in the
favour of victims (the institutional victims in particular, and in that context in particular the European
institutions and there in particular those victims’ interests which relate to assets).”
89 Thus e.g. the Council’s steadily intensifying reference of such matters to Eurojust and Europol which
goes considerably with each reform of their respective legal bases. The informational analysis now
expected of them (see supra p. 573) inevitably means that the resources these institutions have to devote
to such matters are increased.
90 And indeed the member states have decided pro-development on this issue in relation to Europol’s tasks
and powers with the new Decision increasing the Agency’s activities in relation to serious trans-national
and organised crime.
91 In this regard, note that the EuroNEEDS interviews featured 14 national prosecutorial interviewees who
claim to be forced to reduce the scope of cases due to a lack of co-operation from other member states. Also
the 5 further interviewees who report having to do the same because jurisdictional competence is not
sufficiently regulated between member states.
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Ultimately these debates may be viewed as two different sides of one coin; a
European criminal justice system. Unless developments at the supra-national level are
restricted to a singular anomaly; an exceptional area i.e. protecting the financial
interests of the European Union, serious consideration of issues such as coherence
and the development of a genuine system is urgently needed.
Even if an EPPO is created solely to prosecute fraud against the EU budget,
corruption by EU employees, etc., its existence will have effects and highlight lacuna.
The creation of just one body for a very specific purpose does not leave it immune to
the issues faced in general criminal justice systems. Accountability, co-operation with
other agencies and the question of powers must also be addressed. Furthermore, the
presence of an EPP will only serve to highlight the crimes she has not been given
power over which touch a European public interest. Protection of the Euro is a
particularly obvious example. This is a development closely associated with the
European Union but it is not a matter of its financial interests. Protection of the Euro
falls to the member states who can call upon the support of European agencies like
Europol. The problem is that the Euro naturally also requires protection beyond
the borders of the Union. If counterfeit Euro banknotes are produced in e.g.
South America, the entire Eurozone at least has an interest in seeing the
counterfeiters prosecuted. It lacks a prosecutor, however. Such mismatches
between the interests of the European public as such will be highlighted by a
sectoral EPPO; it would be as well to consider them systematically in the
course of the coming debate.
None of this changes the fact that in most European cases, there are member states
who have jurisdiction to prosecute. The principle of subsidiarity requires the Union
only to become active when the member states cannot. If however, the Union is better
placed, or indeed simply permanently better resourced than the member states as well
as more willing to prosecute criminal phenomena no one denies should be prosecut-
ed, it seems illegitimate for the member states to block European development with
the argument that they could assume this task. This is particularly true when their past
behaviour, resource situations and the priorities set as a result speak only for the
conclusion that they will not do so.
Conclusion
The EuroNEEDs study demonstrates that criminal justice practitioners working
on, for and with the European level have specific needs. The broader study
results illustrate steps taken so far as assisting them in overcoming a number of
hurdles and indicating that the situation will continue to improve. This appears
in no small part to be due to the dedication of practitioners working in all
settings in which these cases are currently handled. Clarity as to which mech-
anisms practitioners should use or turn to in which situations would doubtlessly
further improve the situation.
The study, however, also highlights deficits: the European perspective is not as
discernible as it should be even to experienced practitioners. Cases cannot be tackled
as they should be and are inadequately investigated. Furthermore, they are frequently
subject to incomplete prosecution at a level viewed as unacceptable by a majority of
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study interviewees. The practitioners interviewed in the course of the study indicate that
European cases see practitioners on many levels still facing clear limitations in their
ability to tackle these successfully. It is hoped that this study will contribute to the debate
surrounding these topics perhaps assisting the identification of the scope of action which
needs to be taken and the needs which should be met via considered action.
There can be little doubt, however, that action is required. On the one hand sufficient
information about European cases (phenomenon, behaviour, suspected persons and
organisations) must be brought together to ensure the full dimensions of these cases
are apparent to the practitioners investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating them. It is
important that a practitioner network of some kind work together with a common sense
of purpose to gather evidence. Within that network, the practitioner who takes owner-
ship of the casemust be sufficiently involved in all investigative actions in order to guide
the investigation to maximum effect. Clearly this presupposes the existence of an
investigator who takes ownership of European cases. To ensure comprehensive inves-
tigations of European cases, this must mean any idea that cases can be legitimately
reduced to dimensions of national interest must be effectively countered. In other words
a policy of European criminal justice is required. These arguments cannot but be seen to
support the idea of an EPPO working within a clearly defined remit.
Given the inadequacy of the status quo indicated by practitioners who deal with such
cases and the severity of crimes being discussed, it is surely uncontroversial to call for
provision to be made for either comprehensive prosecution of such offences or rules to
be set up to indicate Europe-wide prosecution parameters in accordance to which such
cases are uniformly to be prosecuted. Investigations must then serve that end. Should
only a selective investigation and prosecution of European cases be possible (this will
depend upon the extent of crime and the resources dedicated to investigating and
prosecuting them), a European criminal justice policy relating to such crime is necessary.
The pattern of ad hoc measures of the past must be discarded in favour of coherence.92
In relation to financial crimes the Commission took an initial step in this direction
with its communication of 2011 [26]. How this dialogue will develop remains to be
seen. Any criminal policy setting at the supra-national level clearly brings a new
basket of governance (legitimacy and accountability) issues with it. In relation to the
types of crime described as trans-national in this paper this is yet another matter. The
discussion led at the European level, often referring to organised crime is reported as
marked by two influences: some seeing this as an area for co-operation whilst others
see the need for harmonisation and supra-national institutionalisation.93 The funda-
mental decision will have to be made as to whether these are European cases and any
consequences: institutional and policy-setting, based upon that.
The problem is, of course, that countless issues attach to any such development.
Previous suggestions for an EPPO have consistently been met with criticism that the
creation of an institution prior to harmonised law is illogical.94 With the suggested
Directive for the protection of the financial interests of the European Union, the
92 For brief commentary upon the lack of policy in relation to criminalisation see Klip [94; p. 203].
93 See e.g. Moran Martinez [95; p.109] who describes the creation of Eurojust as a compromised between
these two positions “for some Eurojust was the beginning, for others the end result.” On the need to resolve
this see Lopes de la Motta, J.L. [96; p.65].
94 See e.g. Ambos [97, p.560].
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Commission has taken a first step in the financial interests context to provide for this
broader context in this specific field.
Any bundling of European prosecutorial power bears incredible potential and
cannot take place without securing its transparency, accountability and potential
submission to judicial review on behalf of any person affected by them. Without
particular provision for the defence – which admittedly harbours its own problems
[27] – such developments would represent an unacceptable expansion of “state” or
governance power.
There are indications that the investigation and prosecution of European cases
could potentially be improved organically via the path apparently adopted currently
by many supra-national interviewees; gaining the trust of former colleagues in the
member states for their new (supra-nationalised) role and then using their additional
perspective to suggest action (often informally) to their colleagues in national crim-
inal justice systems. If this path is chosen, it must be clear that a law enforcement gap
is accepted for the foreseeable future even for the serious offences discussed here.
Such acceptance would appear to be in contradiction to action taken by the member
states. Fairly recent Council decisions to enhance Europol and Eurojust’s respective
roles have signalled a determination to tackle serious trans-national and organised
crime. It is the organs of the Union which currently highlight the inadequate protec-
tion of its financial interests95 but it defies imagination to picture the member states
wishing to leave the Union vulnerable to fraud and corruption.96 Furthermore such an
organic approach entrusts investigation and prosecution to national systems currently
facing considerable resource barriers, if not walls.
The need for progress appears particularly acute for EU financial interests-related
offences. National and supra-national interviewees have clearly identified a strong
need for criminal justice professionals identifying with such cases, able to recognise
and initiate their investigation as well as to ensure their full prosecution – even if they
do not necessarily like the idea of the existence of this kind of figure at the supra-
national level.97
A detailed exploration of the principle of subsidiarity and what it means cannot be
delivered within the context of this paper.98 Any debate relating to the creation of an
EPPO will no doubt be marked, as were the EuroNEEDS interviews, by suggestions
that the situation be improved by better utilization of current mechanisms and that
further work at member state level could deliver progress. This is certainly true. The
95 In addition see also the strong statements by the Committee on Budgetary Control of the European
Parliament (known as Cocobu) made as commentary upon annual reports on the protection of the financial
interests of the EU[98; p.2]. See also the concerns expressed by the European Parliament [99].
96 And indeed Hecker speaks of unanimous agreement that the Union’s financial interest must be protected
by the criminal law – see [81; p.496].
97 An EPPO as envisaged by article 86(2) TFEU, i.e. for the financial interests only, was greeted as a
plausible model with which to test the potential of dovetailing such an institution with national prosecution
services by a leading German prosecutor in 2002 – see Frank, C. [100; p.210].
98 For a sceptical summary see Hassemer, W. [93; p.315]. He reports that German experience testifies to a
higher governance/federal level enabled to seize any power it wishes. On the importance of exploring
alternative avenues such as prevention through design (of subsidy programmes) see, e.g. Saetzger, A. [85;
p.138] – drawing upon conclusions of the European Court of Auditors.
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heart of the debate over establishing an EPPO should be whether such a set up can
improve the protection of the financial interests of the EU significantly better than
alternatives.99 The EuroNEEDs study results indicate significant aspects for which
this is likely true. Above all an EPPO’s raison d’etre would be the “ownership” of
cases as European. Comprehensive understanding of criminal activity and pros-
ecution proportionate to it must come naturally to such a figure. Otherwise it
would be devoid of meaning. Given that these aspects are the key features
currently lacking, much speaks for an EPPO with adequate provision being
made to ensure it has the requisite knowledge and capacity. Although many
experts working on the national level oppose developments such as the estab-
lishment of an EPPO, a very significant proportion of their colleagues there, as
well as those now working in the supra-nationalised institutional setting, view
this as the only realistic means to progress; naturally only IF correctly struc-
tured. How a functioning EPPO can be created constitutes the basis of the next
necessary discussion of potential and pitfalls.
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